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perpetrators of these horrors. It would register its protest against them. Some feeling of uneasiness and unsettlement would be experienced after the first perpetration of such deeds. There would be an emotional judgment of disapprobation in the moral sense of an inhibitory judgment and impulse in the sense of duty. Like later activities these might be overborne or disregarded until, through some combination of evil within and special temptation without, the act (*sic*) ceased to be common." This rationalist account of the Fall may be commended to theologians who take their Ethics from the book of Genesis. It may safely be said it is not likely to commend itself to anybody else.

For the rest, the only part of the book in which the thought is at all accurate or trenchant is that upon the "abstract rationalism" of Kant. This includes some good remarks. But even here we seem to have heard most of it before. J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

SHORT STUDIES IN CHARACTER. By Sophie Bryant, D.Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1894.

This little book does not need its apologetic preface. Its contents may be a trifle desultory, consisting as they do of a collection of diverse addresses to various audiences. But there is enough of unity in theme and still more of consistency of conviction to justify embodiment in a volume of "The Ethical Library." "The ostentatious continuity" is so often, and not least in "Theory of Education," the parent of dreariness that the reader may even rejoice to find that between chapters, many of which make a new departure, he may profitably supply links of connection for himself. It is even a doubtful gain, inasmuch as it suggests a methodical treatment to which these "Studies" do not lay claim, that the volume is divided into two "Parts,"—the one "Ethical," dealing "with considerations of character as such," the other "Educational," devoted to a discussion of "educational problems arising therefrom." In style, at times not a little homiletic, in frequency of suggested applications, in the limit at which analysis is cut short, the treatment is really "educational" throughout. No drawback, be it added, when, in addition to what Mr. Spencer would call "a preparation in psychology," there is so much first-hand educational experience, and so much just insight, especially into the souls of young people, as there is here.

In its essence, if we may single out what seems essential from

much else that is interesting, the book is a plea for the use of ideas in the formation of character, and the use of character, in the sense of the conscience, in the formation of ideas. The first of these appears most explicitly in an earnest chapter on "The Intellectual Factor in Moral Education," but it is as emphatically urged elsewhere, especially in the quite pronounced section on "The Influence of Ideals." "If we could only make 'Thou shalt think' the Alpha and Omega of our intellectual education, the 'I will think' of our pupils would probably follow." "Genius, to take the extreme case, will form in one week a habit that gives work for years to stupidity." So elsewhere "Helping the child to grow his new ideas," "instilling into the child's mind right ideas," "transplanting" ideas, are declared to be the main business and hope of the educator. And there is a rationale for the policy,—to wit, the psychological doctrine that "every practical idea tends directly to realize itself in act," or, in other words, that "ideas of conduct do tend in a most real and direct way to realize themselves in conduct." All this we need not dispute. Abstractly, at least, it is true. It is likewise a wholesome protest against the notion that feeling, disciplined by "natural reactions," is (as Spencer would have it) the main element in moral education. Nor when Mrs. Bryant, building upon it, sets a hopeful trust in examples, actual and imaginary, or in "the influence of epigrammatic mottoes" (a rather unhappy word), does she suffer her championship of ideas to carry her into the extravagances of writers like Guyau, who are so much in love with "psychical suggestions" and its possibilities that they write at times as if children can be made to do anything if only they be patted on the back and persuaded that they are able to do it. While, however, it is well that this doctrine should be preached, there is, after all, but little educational comfort in it till we are in possession of a knowledge of the conditions under which ideas become practical. Mrs. Bryant does not fail us here. She is too experienced to be blind to the varieties and idiosyncrasies of the material to be wrought upon; and, indeed, one of the most interesting features of the volume is its discussion of the treatment appropriate to diverse types of character, both good and bad. It might, however, be suggested that the book would be improved by a more direct examination of the human instincts, their nature and number, their order of development, their period of growth and decay. Few subjects, as Professor James has so suggestively pointed out, are of

deeper and more practical educational import than this. And however much we may believe in "ideas,"—*i. e.*, in examples, and precepts, and "mottoes," and ethical literature,—these are all instruments which can be wielded with tenfold effect when insight into the times and seasons at which instincts mature has taught us what ideas are most appropriate to general conditions of temperament, age, sex, and circumstance. This has, in a sense, been understood. Most—or, at any rate, many—parents know that there is a time when the sailor or the shepherd, the fireman or the soldier, does more in the way of example for their young people than the saint or the philanthropist; just as there is one age at which a boy may be introduced to "Treasure Island," and another age at which he may with profit pass on to Thackeray or George Eliot. This, however, has been left too much to chance or rule of thumb. The world needs something more. Nor could any bit of applied psychology well be of greater service to the bewildered parent than a careful study of when and how the unfolding instincts are most effectually to be nourished, or, if need be, repressed. Such a subject would receive justice at the hands of a writer like Mrs. Bryant.

When she comes to plead for carrying the conscience into the things of the mind, Mrs. Bryant is even more emphatic and earnest than elsewhere. The cultivation of soundness of intellect, she tells us, "is as absolutely a duty, though it may not always be so pressing a duty as justice and charity, as courage and self-denial." "The more closely we look at this excellence of the critical impulse, the more clearly do we discern in it the features of the old-fashioned virtue of honesty." "All ignorance is itself the effect of that lack of the honesty which rests not till truth is searched out whole." These are strong statements. It would be easy to suggest needful abatements. After all, a fallacy is not a sin, nor is a false quantity a grave moral offence, though a distinguished head of a college is reported once to have said it was. In mercy to stupidity, on which Mrs. Bryant has little mercy, it might be remarked that public opinion has always been sadly tolerant of intellectual backsliding, and that somehow or other Remorse does not dog the heels of the perpetrator of logical horrors as it does those of the sinner. These, however, are perhaps considerations which do but make a chapter like this the more needful. It is, at any rate, strong doctrine and wholesome, and likely to remain wholesome so long as there are so many people in the world whose

consciences, sensitive to the stain of moral guilt, seem by a strange perversity to feel the yoke of ignorance easy and the burden of unreason light.

There is much else in the book which, did space permit, might well receive attention. A vigorous and well-reasoned attempt to remove some of the seeming contradictions between self-development and self-surrender calls for no remark, as it has already appeared in these pages. Even better, perhaps, is a bright, compact, and clear chapter on friendship,—a subject which has in modern ethics received too little attention. “Ugly Ducklings” handles a theme of perennial interest to every educator; and “The Causes and Cure of Some Moral Defects” touches, with knowledge and insight, but somewhat too cursorily, the pathology of the subject. Readers will find all these chapters profitable.

It may be needful to add, though it is a graceless thing to find even slight flaws in a good book, that it would be possible, with advantage and without serious recasting, to expunge something of the style which, however appropriate in an address, is best absent in print; that a fine quotation from Matthew Arnold is marred by an inaccuracy; that any trifling philosophical gain that may accrue, especially in a book meant for the general reader, is dearly purchased by such words as “other-conscious,” “other-mind,” “ego-altruism;” that the child as “father to the man” is one of those veteran quotations that had better now be honorably superannuated; and that, pending proof of accomplished fact, “the aid of mathematics as well as philosophy” in the construction of a science of just society is a prospect for which, though not perhaps in the accepted sense of the phrase, we cannot find it in us to be sufficiently grateful. A few trifling imperfections such as these, however, detract but little from the merits of a suggestive and valuable contribution to the theory of education.

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PHILOSOPHIE DER BEFREIUNG DURCH DAS REINE MITTEL. Beiträge zur Pädagogik des Menschengeschlechts. Von Dr. Bruno Wille. Berlin: S. Fischer, 1894. 399 S.

The volume under consideration is an interesting and suggestive work, one worthy the attention of a more extended circle of readers. It is not a book written from books, but is founded upon the author's own experience.